Normal Accidents by Charles Perrow (1984) Perrow's (1984) work is reviewed to provide insights into how societies legitimate high-risk technologies that are prone to failure and to environmental disaster.
N
ormal Accidents (Perrow, 1984 ) is a classic that remains a timely and insightful sociological study of the social construction of risks and dangers in society. It provides a structural analysis of variations in the failure rates of risky systems (p. 63). Accidents are failures in a subsystem or whole that damage more than one unit and that disrupt ongoing or future outputs (p. 66). Accidents involve unintended and untoward events; damage people, objects, or both; and impact all levels of a system (pp. 64-65).
Perrow distinguishes component-failure accidents in one or more sequential components from what he terms systems or normal accidents that are inherent in tightly coupled systems with high interactive complexity. Tight coupling means there is "no slack or buffer or give" between system components (Perrow, 1984, pp. 89-90) . Sequences are invariant (p. 93) and have time-dependent processes. Interactive complexity refers to the number and the location of components that interact either necessarily or unintentionally. In complex systems, parts or units not in a production sequence are proximate to one another (pp. 85-86) ; there are many points where one component serves as a common mode connection for other components; there are unintended or unfamiliar feedback loops; there are many control parameters with potential interactions; there are indirect or inferential information sources; and there is limited understanding of some processes. Complex interac-tions that are not part of the original system design can jump from one sequence to another. They cannot be anticipated, are baffling and are nonlinear. Furthermore, transformational systems have greater interactive complexity than do fabrication or assembly systems and hence are more prone to normal accidents.
Normal accidents thus involve unanticipated interactions of multiple component failures. Through extensive examples, Perrow (1984) demonstrates how highrisk systems (that are tightly coupled and that experience complex interactions) result in disasters and in catastrophes. The book is motivated by the possibility of better managing high-risk technologies (p. 3), although the conclusions are not optimistic. Our ability to organize and to manage high-risk technology is insufficient to prevent accidents in high-risk systems; hence, we can create and organize hazards we cannot effectively manage (p. 10). Technologies with catastrophic potential including the potential for ecosystems accidents continue to be financed and put into place by elites, who ignore externalities or social costs of such technologies, costs that will be borne by others (p. 341). Perrow clearly argues that certain technologies have inherent catastrophic potential, but he notes no technological imperative exists to compel society to accept certain technologies. Perrow thus provides his own assessment of the risks of technologies based on coupling and on complexity. Complex and tightly coupled systems are dangerous because they have contradictory organizational requirements (p. 331) that cannot be simultaneously fulfilled. Thus, dangerous accidents lie in the system and not in its components (p. 351). Following this analysis, Perrow argues that at least one complex technology-nuclear power generation-should be abandoned.
Perrow's insights have influenced research in many important areas. These areas include the sociological study of risk analysis (Short, 1984) , the management of risky technology at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Vaughan, 1996) , the organizational production and management of environmental hazards (Clarke, 1989) , the safe management of nuclear weapons (Sagan, 1993) , sense making and control in organizations with complex technology (Weick, 1995, p. 87) , the nature of technology (Weick, 2001a) , and the management of industrial crises (Weick, 2001b ).
Perrow's studies of technological risk (1983 , 1994 Clarke & Perrow, 1996) show that ecosystems accidents and risk sense making are two important areas to address in future research on organizations and the natural environment. Ecosystems accidents emerge from risks and hazards inherent in organizational activity that uses complex, tightly coupled technology. And considerable organizational activity is devoted to making sense of normal risks of technology and to determining those risks that are likely to become large-scale environmental disasters and hazards. In the following sections, I discuss how Perrow's work has influenced research on ecosystems accidents and on sense making. Perrow (1984) initiates discussion of ecosystem accidents by explaining how DNA technology has catastrophic potential that differs from other systems: It creates interactions between systems not previously linked, ones that could not be foreseen as linked (p. 294). Ecosystem accidents occur when one aspect of the ecosystems is unexpectedly linked to another component. There may be limited prior knowledge of this interaction process and of indirect or delayed information and consequences. Technological creations such as genetically engineered organisms or toxic chemicals may impact the natural environment once released, although the environment is not part of the production system and was thought to be independent of the technology. An ecosystem accident is an error in designing or in drawing technological system boundaries, where the technology intervenes unintentionally in the ecosystem. However, it is not possible to calculate the risk of ecosystems accidents in advance of their onset (p. 296), and the onset of ecosystems accidents may be difficult to detect (Turner, 1976 (Turner, , 1978 Gephart, 1984) . As Perrow (1984) suggests, the environmental disaster that ultimately annihilates us may have already begun.
ECOSYSTEMS ACCIDENTS
There are few significant man-made environmental problems that do not have organizations behind them (Perrow, 1997) . Capitalist organizations should be environmentally sensitive because they need to address long-term survival issues. But the horizon of capitalist managers is shorter than the time frame needed to appreciate such problems or to solve them. The unregulated nature of markets and worker dependency on wages means that environmental costs are externalized by firms onto employees and the natural environment. Thus, capitalist firms continue to be important sources of ecosystems disasters.
Perrow's assertion (1984, 1994, 1997 ) that organizations can create ecosystems disasters is central to the risk-society perspective-the approach that conceives of society as currently driven by a logic of risk mitigation (Beck, 1992a (Beck, , 1992b (Beck, , 1997 . In the risk society, unknown and unintended consequences of technological and of economic development become the dominant force (Beck, 1992a, p. 21) . Social institutions address hazardous side effects of wealth creation including environmental damage (Beck, 1992a) . Risks are legitimated by the fact that one neither saw nor wanted their consequences, and they become a natural fate of civilization (Beck, 1992a, p. 34) . Beck (1992a Beck ( , 1992b and Perrow (1984 Perrow ( , 1997 ) assume that it is not possible to prevent technology-based ecosystems accidents given the nature of high-risk technology and given the vested interests certain groups have in continuing a given industrial activity. "Normal catastrophes is the name Charles Perrow . . . gives in his book to this predictability with which what was considered impossible occurs . . . and the more emphatically it is denied, the sooner, more destructively and shockingly it occurs" (Beck, 1992b, p. 104) . Beck (1992a) and Perrow (1984) suggest that environmental disasters are inherently political and involve subpolitical coalitions and new forms of conflict (Beck, 1997) . One way to address the political aspects of risk is to investigate how coalitions or groups produce accounts as grounds for future action in the face of alternative descriptions of reality. For example, political sense-making practices are evident in accident-related talk and in texts that claim a particular view to be accurate and that seek to impose this view on others (Gephart, 1984, p. 213) . Power is the ability to have one's account of reality become the reality perceived by others in the face of alternative claims through use of sense-making practices.
A study of two oil and gas accidents (Gephart, 1984) revealed that the accidents were political accomplishments. Industry and government agents minimized disruptive impacts of disasters, whereas public critics maximized or emphasized impacts in their accounts. Critics had difficulty stopping or preventing activity that created environmental disasters because a priori values, beliefs, and knowledge gave precedence to the needs of capital and because critics lacked access to control settings. Furthermore, disasters had different effects on different groups. Benefits from economic development accrued to industry and to government, but adverse impacts of disasters accrued to local residents and to the natural environment.
Impacts from environmental hazards may go unnoticed for years. Perrow's (1984) research on normal accidents continues to influence research in the organization and environment field. For example, Beamish (2001) studied an ecosystem accident caused by "chronic, small leaks that accumulated . . . over four decades" (Beamish, 2001, p. 6) .
One outcome of ecosystems accidents is normalization or routinization of risk. People adapt their beliefs and expect such events are inevitable and a normal price of progress. Thus, consistent with Perrow's (1984) theoretical insights, subsequent research shows that environmental disasters occur because certain groups and organizations mobilize support for a reality in which certain organizational activities occur. Some groups reap benefits from these activities, but other groups incur damages and costs. Future research needs to investigate how a particular reality or view of risk becomes dominant or accepted such that one group benefits relative to others.
RISK SENSE MAKING
Sense making is relevant to understanding how world views are created and accepted, and it plays an important role in Perrow's analyses of specific accidents. Sense making is the process of reflecting on experience and interpreting the meaning of events. It is evident in verbal and in written accounts. Sense making creates and negotiates an intersubjective world or shared sense of reality (Gephart, 1993 (Gephart, , p. 1470 . Different groups and persons can create different interpretations of the world using sense-making practices, and sense making can involve attempts to reconcile such differences.
Perrow assumes people do sense making to interpret and to understand features of the world. Operators in particular are engaged in sense making when they monitor equipment and processes for evidence of normal versus abnormal operations. Operators create mental models of reality as tools for interpretation (Perrow, 1984, pp. 9, 27) . A key problem in accidents is detecting real technological problems (p. 51). Operators often lack information for effective sense making (p. 53) in part because much information on operations is provided through computerized monitoring. Operators thus experience special challenges in sense making because of the technological medium. For example, in air traffic control, "the inability to see and feel the system directly was a severe handicap for ground controllers despite the great sophistication of the electronic monitoring system" (p. 277). The examples of high-risk systems provided by Perrow show the importance of sense making and of shared meanings in producing and avoiding accidents. Problematic sense making creates faulty understandings, which produce further errors in managing risks and hazards (p. 221).
Clearly, disaster sense making is an important feature of normal accidents. Perrow (1997) notes the important influence organizations have on sense making. Organizations shape our mental activity, categorize experience for us, and favor certain cognitive patterns (p. 70). Thus, to understand how organizations impact the environment, one needs to understand how organizations influence sense making about the environment. Furthermore, given that risk-prone technologies are selected by elites who receive benefits but ignore or externalize key costs onto other groups, it is important to understand how interpretations are created that legitimate high-risk technologies. As Perrow (1984) states, "ultimately, the issue Gephart / NORMAL RISK 23 is not risk but power: the power to impose risks on the many for the benefit of the few" (p. 306).
Research on technology has addressed the imposition of technological risks in several ways. First, Perrow (1983) has examined the role of design engineers in the creation of technology. Designs are created to meet criteria of stakeholders, such as managers, who may be influenced by organizational rewards, sanctions, and beliefs that are inconsistent with those of operators and of other people who must make the system work on a daily basis. Furthermore, suggestions by human factors engineers that address operator or customer needs may be discounted by designers because failures of technology are generally seen as the faults of operators (p. 530). Perrow notes numerous situations where designers created equipment that was difficult to operate and prone to accidents because of design flaws. Thus, designers discounted or ignored operator and end-user interpretations of technology and built risks into the technological system by poor designs that encouraged operator errors and challenges (p. 531). Consequences of poor design were thus borne by operators or customers.
Second, organizations legitimate adoption of high-risk technology by use of fantasy documents including risk assessments (Perrow, 1984) and fantasy plans (Clarke & Perrow, 1996) . As Clarke and Perrow (1996) note, opposition to highrisk technologies leads to plans that promise effective emergency responses. These emergency plans are unrealistic, assume everything will work right, and include bureaucratic prescriptions that were likely never to work (Clarke & Perrow, 1996 , p. 1051 . They are fantasy documents in so far as they emanate from a new system that cannot yet be assessed, address a wide range of accidents even though each accident is unique, and are designed to be maximally persuasive even to experienced people who are discouraged from voicing concerns. Fantasy documents persuade stakeholders to accept the risks of technology but also provide recipes for organizational failure and for massive failure of publics (Clarke & Perrow, 1996) .
Third, research on sense making at public inquiries into disasters provides insights into ways key social institutions impose and legitimate risks. Disasters produce a legitimation deficit in key institutions by showing the potential inability of institutions to protect the public. State agencies and key institutions may fail to maintain mass loyalty if they are delegitimated (Gephart & Pitter, 1993) . Public inquiries are created to develop official, acceptable interpretations of events and to reestablish legitimacy of key institutions (Gephart, 1992 (Gephart, , 1993 .
Inquiries assemble legitimating and critical institutions in an extrademocratic political arrangement. Inquiries legitimate the state by producing procedural legitimation-institutions are shown to have followed correct procedures or are sanctioned for failures. Key institutions are thereby shown to be permanent solutions to ongoing problems of modernization and to have the capability to prevent critical incidents. A key practice used to establish procedural legitimation at inquiries is for government boards to interpret workers'local logics using top-down governmental (formal) safety logics to understand behavior (Baccus, 1986; Gephart, 1992) .
Thus, government boards reestablish legitimacy by showing that government logic would have been effective but was not used because of omission of equipment and because of steps by operators. Recommendations for change tend to blame defective actors (operators), change actors to meet top-down logic demands, or change procedures to make them deductively more effective. By prescribing procedural changes that would deductively be effective if followed, the state displays
